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MAYNARD

XT AL.

v. FRACTIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Jichgan.
DAVID MAYNARD

ET AL.

v. FRACTIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, &c.

A bequest to the members composing the School District Board by name, and
to their successors in officei of moneys to be expended in the purchase of books for
.a district library-they being the officers designated by law to perform similar
duties for the district-is in effect a bequest to the district.
A school district may receive a gift of money to be expended in books for a district library, at the unrestricted discretion of its officers, notwithstanding that by
statute the purchase of books for a district library, wfth district moneys, is subject
to various limitations. Such a general gift is not foreign to the purposes for
which districts exist, but in the direct line of furthering those purposes ; and
therefore the corporation may act as trustee in expending it under the general rules
which confine the action of corporations within the purposes of their creation.
Lucy M. MAYNARD by her last will directed the residue of her
estate, real and personal, not otherwise disposed of, to be sold and
converted into money and applied under the following provisions:
"The effects thereof I give to David A. Woodard, Ilanon Allen,
and Thomas Richards, District Board for Fractional School District
No. 1, in Milan, and No. 1 in York, and their successors for ever,
in trust for the following named purposes: .1 direct that the funds
so placed at the disposal of the said district board shall be placed
at interest by them, and the interest be annually used for purchasing and adding to a school library, the said library to be selected
and cared for by the said District Board or their legal representatives. And it is my wish that such books be selected as will be
suitable for people of all ages and classes within the said district,
and so used by them under proper rules and directions of said board
as shall best promote the interests of education, general literature
and morality."
The validity of this bequest was attacked by two of the heirs at
law. The Circuit Court of Wastenaw county, affirming the order
of the Probate Court, held the provisions to be valid; and the conclusions from the facts found were, "That the fair result of the bequest is to constitute the school district referred to, acting through
its district board, trustees; and that the residue now remaining in
the hands of the executors should be assigned to the persons constituting the district board of said school district and their successors
for ever, for the uses and purposes expressed in said will."
From this order two of the heirs, David and John Maynard,
appeal. ..
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-In order to determine the questions raised by the
appeal it is necessary to consider the legal position of school districts
and school boards.
Every school district is a corporation and the technical corporate
name of this district is, Fractional School District No. 1 in Milan
and No. 1 in York.
The district board have custody and care of all of the property
and moneys of the district (except such as may be confided under
certain circumstances to the director) and are required to apply
and pay over all school moneys belonging to the district in accordance with law. Where there are district libraries, these are under
the care and management of the district board, whose control is
general, and who make selections and purchases, and provide for
the safe-keeping and use of the books.
It is manifest, therefore, that both the intended beneficiary and
the managers are persons known to the law as competent to take
and use all property destined for the legitimate uses of school districts when sufficiently designated and granted.
The object of the will is entirely plain. It proposes to appropriate money to be used and managed permanently for the purposes
of a district school library. The books are to be selected by the
board for the time being, and the selection is with a view to promote
the interests of "education, general literature and morality."
The ordinance of 1789 under which this region was first set
apart for its future creation into states, which have been organized
under its sanctions, declared that religion, morality and knowledge
were necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
and provided that for these expressed purposes, " schools and the
means of education shall for ever be encouraged." It is somewhat
strange, therefore, to have it suggested that libraries are not within
the proper range of school apparatus, or that the purposes set forth
in this will are in conflict with public school purposes. When
schools cease to be used for such purposes they will cease to be
worthy of support or toleration. Nothing but poverty can make
it proper for any school district to deprive itself of the valuable aid
of libraries, which enlarge and supplement the work of the teachers,
and educate people of all ages as no other instrumentalities can
educate them. The bequest in controversy, if invalid, must be so
held because of some infirmity in the legal constitution of the district or in some defect in the declaration of the trust. .
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The bequest is for a purpose coming within the range of charities.
But it is not one which requires any consideration of the doctrines
which apply under the English system to imperfectly defined gifts
and trusts. The property and the trusts are definite, the beneficiary
is definite, and the trustees or managers are definite. If no managers were named, the administration of the trust would devolve on
those officers who manage district business, and the board designated
perform that function. The discretion involved, therefore, is the
discretion of the lawful administrators of the district, and is a corporate discretion. There is no room for technical criticism upon
the question whether the bequest is to the district or to the board.
The intention of the will is not obscure, and the testatrix has
directed the money to be paid just as she would have paid it in person had she desired during life to make a gift to the district.
There is really but one question of any importance- on the record.
That is, whether the corporation is legally capable of administering
such a trust, which the appellants claim is not within the statutory
powers; and they insist these bodies have none but statutory powers,
and cannot go beyond them.
Upon this point the diligence of counsel has collected much learning, but it seems to have been overlooked that the subject has
already been disposed of in this court, and we do not care to enlarge upon it.
In Stuart v. School Distriet No. 1 in Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69,
there was an examination into the powers of school districts to
enlarge and extend their course of instruction and it was held the
statutes cannot be narrowly construed without doing violence to
their intent. In Hathaway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97, the contest
was over a bequest to a village of fifteen thousand dollars to be used
in the erection of a building for a high school. The objection was
made there which is made here, that the purpose was foreign to the
objects of the corporation. It was held, however, not to be repugnant, on the ground that education was a recognised factor in all
civilization, and that schools were as important instruments of public advancement as municipal institutions, and neither foreign nor
incongruous elements in municipal affairs.
Whether school districts could, without statutory authority, raise
money for any library not meant for the purposes of the schools, is a
very different question from whether adistrict library, if obtained without taxation, would be foreign to the educational interests of the
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district. We are not disposed to regard the present library law as
having any especial bearing on this matter. The argument which
in the absence of such a law would exclude a library, would possibly stand in the way of keeping up any library not in all things
patterned after the statute and supported in the same way, But
we have no hesitation in holding, in accordance with the previous
decisions, that there is nothing in our laws which cuts off public
corporations from accepting benevolent offerings to enable them to
extend their usefulness, and benefit their people, by enlarging their
opportunities for culture and refinement, without multiplying or
increasing their burdens. We do not hold that they may not reject such gifts if they have not intelligence enough to appreciate
them. But we think the acceptance of such a bequest as this by a
school district is in the direct line of corporate authority.
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed with costs
of both courts, and the order be remitted for further proceedings.
All the judges concurred.
The objection to the bequest in the
principal case was not ased upon any
inability on the part of the district
authorities to establish and maintain a
district library, for that authority was
fully conferred by the statute, which
authorized the township to vote moneys
for district libraries for the use of residents of the district, and empowered
the district board to expend them. But
the statute also required that the books
should be unsectarian in character and
suitable for a district library. The
power of the board was therefore care.
fully limited and confined within definite
bounds. If now the board could be
empowered by a private donor to purchase books in its discretion, it was said
that books sectarian in character might
be procured, and books not suitable for
a district library, and thus the library be
made up of books not sanctioned by
law, but virtually prohibited, and the
whole character of the library contemplated by law be changed. The
trust would consequently, it was argued,
be for a purpose not contemplated in
the corporate organization, and any
VOL. XXV.-42

action in furtherance of it would be
ultra vires.
It will appear from the opinion that
the court did not deem it necessary to
give much attention to this objection,
considering it covered by the previous
decisions, especially that of Hatkaway
v. Suckett, 32 Mich. 97, in which an incorporated village was held competent
to take a bequest for the establishment
of a high school. In explanation of
that decision it should be stated that
village corporations under the statute
of Michigan do not establish schools;
that power being conferred upon school
districts, which are independent corporations, and the boundaries of which in a
village may or may not be identical
with those of the village itself. The
court held in that cdse that the village
had power to accept the bequest, and
that if further powers were needed to
enable the trust to be executed they
might be conferred afterwards. A somewhat similar ease is that of FirstParik
in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick. 232, in which
there was a devise of lands to a parish
"to be applied to the use of schools,
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and to be kept by the inhabitants for
ever." Tojvns, and not parishes, are
the proper organizations in Massachusets for the creation of schools at
the expense of their corporators, and
they are compelled under penalty to
establish and support them. And the
objection was there made that "parishes
are corporations with limited powers,
relating only to parochial objects, such
as providing for public worsh1P, and
having no authority to hold property for
themselves or other persons to any
other trust or purpose ; at least not for
schools, which is not a duty required of
them by law." But it appeared that
by statute parishes were permitted to
raise money for the support of schools
for their children, and the objection was
therefore held unsound, though it is
inferrible from what is said that it would
have been overruled had no such statute
existed. In PhillipsAcademy v. King,
12 Mass. 546, a question arose that may
be compared to the question made by
the appellants in the principal case,
upon the discretionary authority conferred upon the school board by the
bequest in the selection of books. In
that case a bequest was made to an
academy established with the design of
propagating "Calvinism as containing
the important principles and distinguishing tenets of our holy Christian religion,
as summarily expressed in the Westminster Assembly's shorter catechism ;"
and the bequest which was contested
proposed to add to this "the distinguishing principles of Hopkinsianism, a union
or mixture inconsistent with the original
design." But the court put aside the
objection as unfounded, holding that
the original design was the propagation
of the Christian religion, and the bequest was in furtherance of that design
and in nothing inconsistent with it.
The case of rirst Congregational Sciety of Stonington v. Atwater, 23 Conn.
34, was one in which a bequest to a
corporation required action which in

one particular went clearly beyond the
contemplation of the law in its foundation. It was a gift to a school society
of a town for the establishment and
support of schools, but it required the
trustees to be selected from two named
religious organizations. In this regard
it was quite as objectionable as was the
conferring of general powers upon the
school board to purchase books where
the statute had only given restricted
powers ; but the gift was supported.
In Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 19, it
is decided that a municipal corporation
may receive and hold money in trust
for an object not foreign to its general
purposes, even though the statute had
withheld from it the powers to raise
money by taxation for the same object.
The gift there was to a town for the
purpose of a yearly display of United
States flags, and it was sustained. In
The Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459, a gift
to a town for religious purposes was
sustained, though towns had theii lost
their powe' to make contracts and raise
taxes for those purposes. These cases
cover the general subject. It is conceded that corporations cannot be trustees for purposes not germane to the
purposes for which they are created:
Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Jolmns. 422;
Trustees, &c., v. Peasly, 15 X. H. 317;
Perryon Trusts, sects. 42, 43, and cases
cited ; but where the purposes are germane they maybe such trustees: Philadeiphia v. Fox, 6:4 Penna. St. 169 ;
Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen 575 ; Heuser v.
Harris,42 Ill. 425 ; Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 2 How. 61 ; McDonough's
.Executors v. Miurdocc, 15 How. 367.
Even though other purposes are added
which are not germane: Matter of
Howe, I Paige 214. And we take it
that when the law forbids public moneys
to be expended in the purchase of
sectarian hooks for district libraries, it
does not thereby condemn them, or
declare them foreign to the purposes of
such libraries. The object in the re-

LYNCH v. FALLON.
.. rictiozn is merely to prevent an aha.te;
bit if every religious denomination were
inclined to make presents of its books
to any public corporation connected
with public instruction, it would be extra'irdinary if the corporation should be
fiound lacking in authority to receive
thetn. There is no policy of the law
that would exclude from any public
library any book which is not vicious
and immoral in ain or tendency.
Another point not touched upon in
the principal case is of interest, namely :
Conceding that the authority of the corporation to execute the trust is doubtful,

can the heirs raise the question ? It
has been decided that if the trust is
valid in itself, as this clearly was, being
a charity, only the state and not tie
heirs or-other private parties could inquire into or contest the right of the
corporation as trustee : T ade v. Colouizatwn Society, 15 Bliss. 663. And
see Vidal v. Girard'sExecutors, 2 How.
61, 191 ; Kinnaird v. Miller, 25 Grat.
107 ;
irst Cingregatibnal Scity v.
Atwater, 23 Conn. 34 ; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539 ; Hathaway v. Stckett,
32 lich. 97.
T. M. C.

Supreme Court of Bhode Iland.
CHARLES V. LYNCII v. JOHN FALLON..
A broker employed by A. to negotiate an exchange of properties between him
and B., cannot recover commissions of B., although after the exchange was effected
he expressly promised to pay.

&SSUMPSIT heard by the court, jury trial being waived.
ifenry B. Whitman, for plaintiff.
B. N. ,. S. S. Lapham, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFiEE, C. J.-This is an action of assumpsit to recover $2500
for commissions for the plaintiff's services as a broker in negotiating
tin exchange of real estate. The two estates exchanged were a
hotel estate, belonging to tle defendant, situated in Worcester, and
valued by tile defendant at $125,000, on one side, and a tract of
land belonging to the West Elmwood Land Company, situated in
Providence, on the other side. There was, subject to mortgages,
an even exchange. The plaintiff claims that the defendant made
him an express promise to pay him the regular commissions before
the exchange, and after the exchange promised to pay him $2500.
The defendant denies this. We think the agreement is proved.
The defendant contends that, if proved, it is not binding upon him,
the plaintiff having been previously employed by the West Ehwood
Land Company to sell their land, and being in their employ throughout the transaction. We think this is proved. The plaintiff has

